Back in May 2004, the Houston Metropolitan Transit Authority (HMTA) announced the selection of Frank Wilson as the new CEO of HMTA. The initial package offered to him was so lucrative that one was led to believe that Mr. Wilson must be one of the best mass transportation specialists in the country. Cursory research produced results that quickly proved the contrary.
Mr. Wilson’s 2004 package included a generous inclusion into the Metro pension, a membership to the elite Houston Club, moving expenses, temporary housing, $254,000 salary, vehicle allowance, and more. What does this have to do with the present? Please read on.
On May 23rd, 1989 Frank Wilson was appointed to the position of Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) General Manager (http://www.bart.gov/docs/BARThistory.pdf). After approximately 5 years, he was hired as the New Jersey Department of Transportation Commissioner.
Mr. Wilson’s fiascos appear to begin with his NJDOT appointment. Below are highlights from the State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation, “E-ZPass The Making of a Procurement Disaster”,
June 2004 (http://www.state.nj.us/sci/pdf/ezpass.pdf).
On March 10, 1998, a consortium of public transportation agencies formally executed a contract for the design, installation, operation and maintenance of an electronic toll collection (ETC) system that would link New Jersey to the regional network known as E-ZPass. The contract was unique in a number of aspects, not the least of which was that it formed the basis for the largest, most complex ETC system ever proposed.
Once the contract was executed, however, the project immediately began to unravel, and the fallacies of the self-funding plan became publicly apparent.
The E-ZPass contract was the product of an ill-advised, inappropriate procurement process that lacked proper safeguards to ensure accountability and to protect the public’s interest. In essence, a major capital project of unprecedented scope and technical complexity was removed from the sphere of normal competitive bidding and treated for procurement purposes, as a contract for professional service.
Its injudicious use in this instance constituted the foundation of an administrative and financial debacle of immense proportions, a debacle that laid bare serious gaps in the laws governing public-project contracting in this state.
On one level, then-NJDOT Commissioner Frank J. Wilson engaged in private sector employment discussions with companies doing business with the state, including two with corporate links to the procurement, one of which hired Wilson (MFS). Though he signed a letter purportedly recusing himself from the procurement process at the time, an examination of the full record suggests he violated the terms of that recusal at a critical stage in the vendor-selection process.
Frank Wilson established a relationship with MFS while working as General Manager of the Bay Area Rapid Transit. Lockheed (an unsuccessful bidder) charged that the NJ Transportation Commissioner Frank J. Wilson “has been involved in career discussions with members of each bidding team … but it appears that he did not recuse himself from participating in the process.” Lockheed added: “Wilson’s involvement under these circumstances clearly opens the entire evaluation and decision process to challenge” and “gives rise to significant questions about the validity of the (evaluation) process.” Lockheed’s letter also protested that the rules were changed midstream to the company’s disadvantage.
Remarkably, the public transportation consortium agreed to participate in a thoroughly lopsided public/private partnership in which the vendor was authorized to share in the profits if the project yielded a surplus but would bear none of the loss in the event of a deficit.
As of 2003, nearly $575 million had been spent on E-ZPass while total revenues from the two primary projected sources – administrative fees collected from E-ZPass violators and commercial leasing of fiber-optic cable – barely topped $100 million. Meanwhile, the system’s overall cost continues to mount and is expected to exceed $1.2 billion when the current contract expires in 2012. This was supposed to have been a self funded project!
Now to the present…the Houston Metropolitan Transit Authority currently employs Mr. Wilson. The Metropolitan Transit Authority board recently approved a 10 % raise for CEO Frank Wilson, bringing his total compensation to more than $340,000.
And one can’t say Frank Wilson doesn’t remember his friends. Engineer Frank Russo has followed Frank Wilson from the Bay Area Rapid Transit, to New Jersey, and now to Houston. While Commissioner of New Jersey DOT, Frank Wilson created an office to oversee projects like the South Jersey line and the Hudson-Bergen project. Frank Wilson appointed Frank Russo to head this new office. The Hudson-Bergen project was designed, built, and operated by Raytheon (a winning bidder). Following Mr. Wilson’s example, in 1998 Mr. Russo left his position with New Jersey and incredibly went to work for Raytheon!
In February 2008, Mr. Wilson (Houston MTA) hired Frank Russo again. Frank Wilson contracted Mr. Russo at a whopping $1 million for the first two years. These two have enjoyed business together for quite some time (http://www.southjerseynews.com/lightrail/images/13a042201.pdf).
Besides the malfeasance mentioned above, both the E-ZPass and rail line were plagued with problems. Remarkably, Frank Wilson is the CEO of the Houston Metropolitan Transit Authority!
Topics: bart, fiasco, frank, Houston, jersey, metro, metropolitan, mfs, MTA, new, raytheon, Texas, transit, wilson
Frank Wilson -- How did he land this job at Metro? | 
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